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Abstract
We study the emergence of the recent form of terrorism using evolutionary game theory. The
model is an economic interpretation of René Girard's theory of mimetic rivalry. This theory
presents terrorism as the result of competition between countries, when the desire to imitate
the leading country is frustrated by the impossibility of doing so. We define a multi−country
setup where interaction takes place in an international trade game, which is a coordination
game. Countries follow a simple behavioral rule trying to reduce the gap between the
maximal payoff obtained and their own payoff. In a coordination game, this may lead to
mimetic rivalry behavior, that is the deliberate choice of a strategy degrading the situation of
the leading country. Paradoxically, we find that the desire of convergence may lead to a more
partitioned world economy.
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René Girard (1996)’s theory of mimetic rivalry presents terrorism as the result of
competition between countries, when the desire to imitate the leading country is
frustrated by the impossibility of doing so. Integration and economic competition are
usually viewed as the way to generate positive gains for all participants of international
trade. In this paper, we show that even if global integration is a Pareto-dominant state,
it can lead to negative behaviors with the aim of degrading the situation of the leading
country.
We use an evolutionary game model1 describing the long-run behavior of n
asymmetric countries. Cross-country differential may come from the country size,
the technology used or the endowment of knowledge but are not formally described in
our model.2 Asymmetries are captured by the gain a country makes in international
trade, which is summarized in a simple coordination game. In this game, each country
has to choose between two strategies: integrating the world economy or not, that is
staying in autarky. Integrating the world economy may lead to the Pareto-dominant
outcome, even if the gain from this coordination differs between countries.
Each country follows a simple learning rule of satisﬁcing, trying to reduce the gap
between the leading country’s payoff and its own payoff. In the international trade
game, we show that this learning rule may lead to the choice of a strategy which is
intended to degrade the situation of the leading country. Thisnegative behavior is close
to the mimetic rivalry concept in that it is generated by the failure to obtain the same
thing as the leading country. The mimetic rivalry behavior is generated in our model
by the presence of cross-country differential and the fact that integrating the world
economy may not constitute a risk-dominant strategy for lagging countries. In the
long run, as the payoff of the leading country rises, one observes the formation of two
blocs which reﬂects the persistent gap between the leading country (and its satellites)
and the others, for instance more and less developed countries, even non-islamic and
islamic countries.3 Thus, and perhaps paradoxically, the desire to obtain the same
thing as the other (in our model, the same payoff), that is the desire of convergence,
may lead to a more partitioned world economy.
Our results may be related to Goodfriend and McDermott (1998)’s theoretical
predictions resulting from cross-country disparities. They deﬁne the notion of
familiarities in order to account for asymmetries between countries, and to explain the
rising of the productivity gap between less and more developed countries. The lack
of familiarity with the leading economy is due to such barriers as distance, language,
and culture, or deliberate impediments to commercial intercourse. In their model, an
enormous productivity gap is hard to close because it inhibits the kind of commercial
interaction that promotes familiarization and reduces asymmetries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the evolutionary
model of Mimetic Rivalry. Section 3 states the long-run equilibria of the model.
Section 4 concludes the paper and gives some comments.
1For book-length introductions to evolutionary game theory, see Vega-Redondo (1996) and
Weibull (1995).
2This paper is not interested in the origin of the cross-country differential but rather by
the consequences. For more details on the literature of international trade, see Grossman and
Helpman (1991).
3As noted by René Girard, under the label of Islam, we ﬁnd a will to rally and mobilize an entire
third world of those frustrated victims in their relations of mimetic rivalry with the West.
12 An evolutionary model of Mimetic Rivalry
The model we present is inspired by the recent developments of evolutionary game
theory. In this literature, players are boundedly rational agents using past experience
and simple behavioral rules. We use methods introduced by Kandori, Mailath and
Rob (1993) and Young (1993) to examine the long-run behavior of players.4
We consider a population of n asymmetric countries denoted byC =f1;:::;i;:::;ng,
with n  2. Asymmetries may come from the country size, the technology used
or the endowment of knowledge but they are not formally described in our model.
Asymmetries are captured by the gain a country makes in the international trade,
which is summarized by a 22 coordination game. In this game, each country i
has to choose between two strategies: integrating the world economy (Strategy E) or
not, that is staying in autarky (Strategy A). Time is measured discretely and indexed by
t = 1;2;3:::. In each period, countries are repeatedly matched to play the coordination
game and adjust their behavior over time. Let the international trade between countries




where 0 < li < ai for all i 2 C. In this game, (E;E) and (A;A) are two strict Nash
equilibria, with the added feature that (E;E) Pareto-dominates (A;A). Thus, it is
assumed that « integrating the world economy » can lead to the Pareto-dominant
outcome even if the gain for this cooperation can differ between countries (the
gain from autarky can also be different). This assumption is made without loss of
generality.5
We deﬁne the evolutionary dynamics describing the strategic behavior adopted by
countries in the long run. In an evolutionary model, results are driven by two different
mechanisms: selection and mutation.
2.1 The selection mechanism
Let zt be the number of countries adopting strategy E at time t. The average payoff of












Note that the payoff to playing A is independent of the distribution population, so
that ui(A;z) = ui(A) = li. Thus, if a country chooses strategy A, his payoff is li no
4We refer the reader to these articles for a more detailed discussion of the model assumptions.
5Forinstance, assumingthatintegratingtheworldeconomycannotleadsomecountriestothePareto-
outcome reinforces the result of the model.
2matter what the others’choices are. If it chooses strategy E, then its payoff depends on
zt, the number of countries participating in the world economy.
In an evolutionary model, the way players choose their strategies, revise their
previous choices and thus get experience, is described by a selection mechanism.
This mechanism considers that players are myopic and adaptive, implying that they
do not form expectations about the future course of play and simply take into account
the decisions made in the past. The selection mechanism adopted here reﬂects René
Girard’s theory of mimetic rivalry. To this end, we use a variation of the satisﬁcing
dynamics proposed by Smallwood and Conlisk (1979).
Let ut = (u1t;:::;uit;:::;unt) be the payoff proﬁle of countries at period t. In the
same way, deﬁne the strategy proﬁle at t as st = (s1t;:::;sit;:::;snt). We denote by µ
the maximal payoff realized. This maximal payoff can be attained by one or several
countries at a given period. Countries are assumed to observe µ, which represents
some level of satisfaction. Next, they compare it to the average payoff which they earn
from their current strategy s. When µui > 0, countries choose a strategy in order
to reduce the gap between µ and their own payoff. Formally, country i selects at t a
strategy satisfying the behavioral rule
sit 2 argmins µui(s;zt): (3)
The state space (the range of zt) of the dynamic process (3) is identiﬁed with the
set Z = f0;1;:::;ng.
The idea of mimetic rivalry is close to the behavioral rule deﬁned in (3). Recall that
mimetic rivalry is the frustration generated by the desire to imitate the other in order
to obtain the same thing. In our model, « reducing the gap » can lead to two types of
behavior: either a country can choose a strategy that increases its payoff (compared to
the maximal payoff), or it can choose a strategy with the aim of degrading the situation
of the country with the maximal payoff. When the beneﬁts of trade are relatively low
(i.e., aili low), the latter behavior can appear to be the best for a country. This nega-
tive behavior is similar to mimetic rivalry in that it is generated by the failure to obtain
the same thing as the best country. In section 3, we demonstrate that the mimetic ri-
valry behavior is due to the presence of asymmetries between countries, leading to the
autarky strategy which induces a reduction of the advantages of the leading countries.
Evolutionary game theory does not consider that all players simultaneously adjust
their strategy following (3) at each period t. Rather, there is some inertia in
evolutionary models, that is to say players infrequently adjust their strategies. The
inertia assumption is not a necessary assumption in our model but it gives some
plausibility to the assumption of myopic behavior: as players know that only a small
segment of agents changes its action, strategies that proved to be effective today are
likely to remain effective in the near future. Formally, each player independently with
some ﬁxed probability q 2 (0;1] receives the opportunity to update its strategy in each
period.
2.2 The selection mechanism with mutations
Besides the selection mechanism, the presence of mutations is the other assumption
inﬂuencing results in evolutionary models. With a small probability, each player «
mutes » and plays a non-optimal strategy in the sense of selection mechanism (3). This
3mechanism is then perturbed6. We may propose two economic justiﬁcations to sustain
the idea of mutation phenomenon in our setup. Firstly, mutation can be viewed as «
deliberate experimentation » of a new strategy. Players are uncertain as to the structure
of the economy and then experiment strategies in order to obtain some information as
to how they work in some contexts. This approach is based on trial-and-error learning.
Secondly, we may argue that mutation corresponds to the exits of players that are
replaced with new players knowing less or nothing about the game and so choose a
strategy at random.7
Formally, each player independently changes its strategy with a small probability
e. A player mutation occurs after the completion of the learning adjustment. The
combination of selection mechanism (3) and the mutation phenomenon generates a
Markov chain over state space Z. The recent literature on evolutionary game theory
shows that the existence of a small probability e > 0 ensures that the process has
a unique stationary distribution8 summarizing the long-run behavior of the system,
regardless of initial conditions. The latter characteristic of the model is particularly
interesting when the selection mechanism presents several absorbing states, since
it allows a selection to be made between them. Our goal is to ﬁnd the long-run
equilibrium of the game assuming that e ! 0. The long-run equilibrium is simply
the one requiring the fewest mutations.9
3 The long-run equilibria of the international trade
game
Harsanyi and Selten (1988)’s concept of risk-dominance plays a crucial role in
our model. This criterium proposes an equilibrium selection theory based on the
comparisons of riskiness of the equilibria. The risk-dominant equilibrium is the one
with the largest Nash product, that is, the one for which the product of the deviation
losses is largest.
In the stage game deﬁned in the previous section, the Pareto-dominant equilibrium
(E;E) risk-dominates (A;A) if (ai li)(aj lj) > lilj. Assume that countries are
perfectly symmetric, that is ai = aj and lj = li for all i; j 2 C. Then, (E;E) risk-
dominates (A;A) if li < ai=2, meaning that the payoff from the autarky strategy must
be less than half of the payoff from trade. Deﬁning a world of symmetric countries as
a place where li < ai=2, ai = aj and lj = li for all i; j 2C, we can state the following
result.
Proposition 1 In a world of symmetric countries as deﬁned above, the long-run
equilibrium of the international trade game is the one in which all countries are
engaged in the world economy.
This result comes from Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993)’s model which states that
the long-run equilibrium in coordination games is the one associated with the largest
6Samuelson (1997) considers the mutation phenomenon as a residual capturing of whatever has been
excluded when modeling selection.
7See Canning (1989).
8See Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) or Young (1993).
9For more details on this result, see Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) or Samuelson (1997) or Vega-
Redondo (1996).
4basin of attraction, that is the risk-dominant one. When countries are symmetric,
the mechanism selection (3) is payoff monotonic dynamics10 in which any strategy
enjoying the highest payoff should never decrease. The result of Proposition 1 holds
for low asymmetries, but differs when the gap between countries, represented by
aili, becomes large enough.
In order to see how the mimetic rivalry behavior emerged in our evolutionary
model, it is necessary to deﬁne a world of asymmetric countries. To this end, consider
the non-empty subsets CE and CA with CE [CA  C. CE represents the subset of
countries for which strategy E is the risk-dominant strategy (that is the strategy
associated with the highest deviation losses). In the same way, CA is the subset of
countries for which A is the risk-dominant strategy. Then, assuming that there is no
country for which ai = 2li, we can establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2 In a world of asymmetric countries as deﬁne above, country j 2 CA
for which aj lj < µ=(n1) chooses strategy A from the equilibrium in which all
countries are engaged in the world economy.
Proof. Consider state zt = n and assume that country j 2 CA receives the oppor-
tunity to update its choice at period t > t. With strategy E, country j’s payoff is
aj < 2lj and it has to compare it to µ. On the other hand, using strategy A country j
obtains lj and compares it to [(n2)=(n1)]µ. Thus, country j chooses strategy A if
ajlj < µ=(n1). 
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is the following. In state zt = n, the leading
countries’payoffisµ. Duringthesubsequentperiods, theothercountriescomparetheir
own payoff to µ and possibly change their strategies when they receive the opportunity
of doing so. For countries j = 2 CE, choosing strategy A may reduce the gap µuj
because (i) the gain from trade is close to the gain from autarky (aj lj low) and (ii)
strategy A degrades the payoff of the leading bloc.
The mimetic rivalry condition, deﬁned in Proposition 2, speciﬁes how the gap
between strategies A and E has to be large for the appearance of the negative behavior
in CA. Thus, country j’s membership of CA is not a sufﬁcient condition for playing
strategy A, and the set of countries adopting the mimetic rivalry behavior may be
empty even in an asymmetric world. It can be seen that for n very large compared
to the leading countries’ payoff the mimetic rivalry condition may be hard to fulﬁll.
However, this can be outweighed when µ is large enough.
As cross-country differential increases, the number of countries j 2 CA choosing
the negative behavior becomes larger. At one extreme, this may generate the formation
of two blocs reﬂecting the persistent gap between less and more developed countries.
Thus, and paradoxically, the desire to obtain the same thing (here, the same payoff),
that is the desire of convergence, may lead to a more partitioned world economy and
the deliberate choice of degrading the situation of the leading bloc.11
4 Conclusion
This paper offers a positive explanation of the recent form of terrorism. It presents
an economic interpretation of René Girard’s theory of mimetic rivalry by using
10See Weibull (1995).
11This may be related to the literature on trade and war. See, for example, Bearce and Fisher (2002).
5evolutionary game theory. The model shows that integration and greater cross-country
interaction between symmetric countries lead in the long-run to the highest payoff
strategy, that is to say, integration in the world economy as a Pareto-dominant state.
However, when one observes the presence of large cross-country differential, global
integration may lead to negative behaviors as the deliberate choice of degrading the
situation of the leading country or leading bloc. Large disparities may be related to the
notion of familiarity of Goodfriend and Mc Dermott (1998), in which an unfamiliar
country is characterized by barriers towards cultural or commercial interaction. This
kind of unfamiliar country is expected to develop negative behaviors towards the
leading country because of the existing gap. This result may be related to the idea
that cross-country interaction is a powerful means of reducing disparities between
countries. Some empirical studies, as Keller (2001), show that technological diffusion
does not depend directly on trade ﬂows. It can be argued that trade alone is unable to
generate a greater familiarity between countries, and may even lead to violence and
terrorism, as developed by the notion of mimetic rivalry.
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